Optimal Control of Fractional Punishment in Optional Public Goods Game
Abstract
Improving cooperation is a key issue in many systems and organizations. Punishment is a mechanism to improve cooperation, but it can be expensive [1], and consequently it itself becomes a Public Good [2]. Several mechanism to implement punishment are encountered in the literature including sanctioning only a fraction of the free riders [3]. This approach reduces the number of free riders, and consequently the cost of the sanctioning system. [...]
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References
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